

TALKING POINTS

BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE GERMANS

NATO, Including Possible Reforms and US Missile Proposal

(To be discussed at German initiative)

Anticipated German Position

1. Military Integration and NATO Mobile Force. European geography and modern military technology require the integration of the NATO military effort: forces, commands, air defense, logistics and training. Germany's needs for logistic and training facilities outside her borders are not being met fast enough. France is impeding military integration.

It is essential to proceed with setting up the dual-capable mobile force suggested by General Norstad last year.

2. Nuclear Weapons, NATO MRBM Force and NATO Strategy. Germany is most interested in the possibility of NATO nuclear sharing and broadening of the NATO Atomic Stockpile concept as suggested by General Norstad. What are our present views?

Germany is also strongly in favor of the NATO MRBM force concept and believes it should be implemented whether or not France participates. What is the status of the US concept?

The British paper on strategy is useful in bringing out in the open basic questions about NATO. Germany believes NATO should have an adequate conventional capability in the shield forces, but as Strauss has pointed out, it is similarly important to maintain adequate tactical nuclear weapons in the shield. They would be interested in any views we have on the questions involved.

3. WEU Restrictions. Germany is being hampered by WEU restrictions. Limitations on such matters as size of naval vessels hobble Germany in trying to meet its military requirements. Unreasonable delays occur between German requests for relief from such restrictions and action by the WEU Council. The US, bilaterally, or through SACEUR, should bring pressure on the British and others blocking such relief.

4. Nuclear Submarine Cooperation. Germany is still interested in US help in the construction of a nuclear-powered submarine and hopes that the US will reconsider the request which the US treated negatively in 1960.

5. NATO Commands. Germany should be represented on SACLANT's staff. The UK and France in the Standing Group will probably veto such representation.

6. Interest in Atomic

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Recommended US Position

1. Military Integration and NATO Mobile Force. The US agrees fully as to the desirability of military integration in NATO. We are willing to share depots in Europe and make available training areas in the US if Germany wishes. Standardization of equipment, which is difficult to achieve, should be encouraged. We favor further application of costsharing and multilateral financing, as in the case of infrastructure.

We are favorably inclined to Norstad's idea on a mobile force. As far as we know he has not yet worked up a complete project.

2. Nuclear Weapons, NATO MRBM Force and NATO Strategy. Most of these subjects are now under study and review in connection with the Acheson Review Group. Until this work is completed and the results considered it is difficult to tell them what our views will be.

Our views on the British paper will necessarily be dependent on the outcome of this review. We agree that it is desirable for all of us to consider the basic questions raised.

3. WEU Restrictions. The Germans will understand our role is limited by the fact that we are not members of WEU. We hope WEU restrictions will not interfere with German fulfillment of recognized NATO requirements. Perhaps judicious wording of proposals for the removal of restrictions on an ad hoc basis, commensurate with NATO force goals, would help expedite action.

4. Nuclear Submarine Cooperation. We have not reviewed the German request. Our first reaction would be that there has not been much change in the situation and that the problems cited in Mr. Herter's letter of last May (political opposition in Europe and quite possibly in the US as well) would have to be weighed carefully in deciding whether any action was feasible or wise.

5. NATO Commands. We agree that Germany should be represented on the SACLANC staff. This would seem to be a political problem for resolution bilaterally with the countries concerned.

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DISCUSSION

NATO MRBM Force. Although Adenauer has not spelled out his view, he apparently favors the MRBM project as a way of satisfying probable future German aspirations for nuclear weapons and thus restraining Germany from proceeding independently. The Germans feel that they went further than the other countries at the December NAC meeting and accepted in principle the MRBM concept. Thus they are particularly interested in its status.

WEU Restrictions. The difficulty here is that Germany customarily proposes broadly worded amendments, while the UK and France often favor an item by item lifting of restrictions, in strict accord with SACEUR's recommendations. The WEU Council acts promptly on German requests, once they are received, but preliminary political soundings by SACEUR often result in time-consuming delays.

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